It is generally accepted that good corporate governance, executive compensation and the threat of litigation are all important mechanisms for incentivizing managers of public corporations. While there are significant and robust literatures analyzing each of these policy instruments in isolation, their mutual relationship and interaction has received somewhat less attention. Such neglect is mildly surprising in light of a strong intuition that the three devices are structurally related to one another (either as complements or substitutes). In this paper, we construct an agency cost model of the …rm in which corporate governance protections, executive compensation levels, and litigation incentives are all endogenously determined. We then test the predictions of the model using a …rm-level data set including governance, executive compensation, and securities litigation variables. Consistent with our predictions, we …nd governance and compensation to be structural substitutes with one another, so that more protective governance structures tend to coincide with lower-powered incentives in executive contracts. Also consistent with our predictions, we …nd executive compensation and shareholder litigation appear to be structural complements to one another, so that higher powered incentives tend to catalyze more frequent litigation. In fact, we estimate that each 1% increase in the incentive component of a CEO's contract predicts 0.3% increase in the likelihood of a securities class action and a $3.4 million dollar increase in expected settlement costs. In addition, the complementarity of executive compensation and litigation allows us to formulate new ways to test for the e¤ects of legal reform, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The results of our preliminary tests appear inconsistent with the claims of the statute's proponents that the PSLRA systematically discouraged non-meritorious litigation without burdening meritorious claims, particularly for …rms with relatively low volatility.
Introduction
Most modern theories of corporate behavior turn critically on the foundational premise of managerial agency costs -the misaligned incentives that incubate in the interstices where ownership diverges from control. 1 No doubt a testament to the power of the agency cost approach, individual scholars from a multiplicity of disciplines routinely invoke it to motivate their own varied institutional inquiries. Corporate and securities law scholars, for example, consider how the threat of legal liability (through such doctrines as securities fraud or …diciary duties) might tend to ameliorate managerial incentive problems. 2 Organizational scholars focus on how the corporate governance structure of …rms (such as board composition, voting structure, and takeover defenses) may provide forms of direct oversight and concomitant managerial discipline. 3 Compensation scholars, in contrast, focus on how compensation schemes can motivate corporate …duciaries to act "as if" they were in the shoes of shareholders. 4 The underlying motivation behind this paper is the observation that each of above analytical foci, while informative on its own terms, is almost certainly incomplete when viewed in isolation. In other words, we begin with the premise that the "portfolio" of intra…rm incentive devices (including governance, compensation and litigation) can be best understood only if all its major components are viewed in conjunction with one another. This observation is based on both intuition and empirical observation. Empirically, it is clear that we observe each of the above incentive devices in everyday practice, suggesting that they tend to work as part of a larger mechanism for providing managerial incentives. Moreover, …rst principles would lead one to predict all three mechanisms to work simultaneously, since each plays a pivotal role at a slightly di¤erent context, and each likely exhibits decreasing returns. Corporate governance systems largely represent an ex ante command-and-control approach, constraining the authority of managers and inculcating more direct shareholder oversight of managerial conduct early on. Litigation, in contrast, is more squarely a source of ex post incentives, imposing liability on a manager when a judicial actor deems the manager's prior conduct to have proximately caused a veri…able loss in …rm value. Executive compensation stakes out somewhat of a middle ground, providing managers with rewards when various benchmark signals of value (such as earnings reports) are met, even though the …rm's ultimate return may remain concealed from view.
In theory, any of these devices, if operating perfectly, might be able to solve managerial agency cost problems completely. In reality, however, each su¤ers from drawbacks that ultimately limit its singular use. Direct oversight through an invasive corporate governance structure, for example, may restrain managerial opportunism, but it does so by reducing organizational ‡exibility, introducing bureaucracy, and re-introducing the very monitoring cost that shareholders presumably hope to avoid by hiring a professional manager. 5 Litigation, as well, is frequently undermined by the fact that courts are admittedly poor arbiters in hindsight of managerial business decisions, thereby rendering them prone to errors that can both catalyze strike suits and dampen the deterrence value of litigation. 6 Finally, a number of costs also attend incentive pay, not the least of which is the fact that paying signi…cant rents to managers necessarily forces non-managerial shareholders to reduce their own payo¤s. Furthermore, while incentive pay can help motivate managers to work hard on behalf of increasing share price, it also provides an independent motivation for managers to mislead public investors about the …rm's near-term prospects, so as to increase their remuneration and to preserve their prospective ability to extract private bene…ts of control. Given these limitations, it seems likely that each of the above devices is unlikely to serve as an independent panacea for corporate agency costs. 7 Viewed against this context, it is perhaps mildly surprising that much of the existing literature tends to focus on various manifestations of intra…rm incentives in isolation, abstracting away from the general interactions that can complicate analysis. While understandable for reasons of analytical tractability, such neglect can prove problematic for a number of reasons: First, it may render faulty predictions by failing to account for feedback e¤ects that echo against other institutional sub-structures. For example, a reform to securities fraud law (such as the signi…cant reforms that took place in early 1996) may directly alter litigation behavior among participants, but it may also a¤ect the manner in which executives are compensated or the intensity of shareholder oversight of the company through changes in the corporate governance regime. These changes may themselves have boomerang e¤ects within the litigation market that deserve attention if one wishes to make predictions about the e¤ect of reform. Relatedly, non-systematic inquiries can yield empirical …ndings that will be di¢ cult (and sometimes even impossible) to interpret without greater understanding of the relevant interaction e¤ects at play. And …nally, myopic attention to a single institutional structure is likely to yield myopic policy prescriptions about how courts, regulators, …rms or society in general should respond. In light of these problems, it is important for scholars to develop frameworks for thinking about mechanisms of incentive provision in a systemic fashion.
Our paper contributes to this systemic approach to managerial incentives in at least two respects, the …rst theoretical and the second empirical. First, we develop and analyze a game-theoretic model in which the corporate governance regime, incentive compensation for corporate …duciaries, and securities litigation are all determined endogenously, each contributing independently to the panoply of incentives that shape managerial e¤ort and disclosure. Within this framework, we show that compensation and corporate governance tend to be structural substitutes of one another, so that (all else held constant) more invasive corporate governance tends to minimize the necessity of signi…cant incentive contracts (and vice versa). Moreover, compensation and securities litigation within our framework are predicted to be structural complements of one another, so that larger incentive compensation levels increase the expected incidence of litigation, as incentive compensation often provides a temptation to issue misleading corporate disclosures. At the same time, however, we demonstrate the di¢ culties that one might face in attempting to quantify these mutual relationships in "reduced" form. In particular, variations in a number of unobserved parameters can cause simultaneous responses in governance, compensation, and litigation that may generate apparent correlations that cut against their predicted structural relationships.
We then employ our theoretical predictions to inform empirical tests using a large data set that merges observations on governance, executive compensation and private securities class actions among publicly traded …rms. The structural relationships predicted in our theoretical model appear largely to be borne out, as governance and incentive compensation operate as substitutes while incentive compensation and securities litigation operate as complements. Although these relationships appear manifest both in the absence and presence of statistical instruments derived to control for endogeneity problems, in nearly all cases the e¤ect is both economically and statistically strongest in the presence of endogeneity controls (once again consistent with our predictions). Perhaps of particular interest, we estimate that each 1% increase in the fraction of a CEO's contract devoted to medium-to long-term incentives (rather than shortterm compensation) predicts a 0.3% increase in expected litigation and a $3.4 million dollar increase in expected settlement costs. While these estimates are still preliminary, they appear signi…cant both statistically and economically. In addition, the complementarity of executive compensation and litigation allows us to formulate new ways to test for the e¤ects of legal reform, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. The results of our (also preliminary) tests appear to suggest that even if the PSLRA reduced frivolous litigation (as its proponents claim), it likely deterred meritorious litigation as well, and in such proportions as to swamp the deterring e¤ects on non-meritorious suits.
In addition to these concrete results, the general framework developed here may also prove helpful in assessing the likely e¤ects of current and forthcoming reforms in corporate and securities regulation. Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (or SOX) is notable precisely because it constitutes not only a reform to traditional securities fraud laws 8 , but it also has mandaded signi…cant changes in both corporate goverance structures 9 and executive compensation. 10 In order to understand the ultimate e¤ects of these reforms, then, it is imperitive that one comperehends the structural relationship between the constituent parts of SOX. Given that our analysis uncovers somewhat stronger structural relationships between governance, compensation and litigation than simple historical correlational analysis would suggest, there may be greater reason than many currently suggest to think that the SOX reforms are capable of having durable e¤ects.
Because this paper aims to provide a systemic account of incentive mechanisms, the relevant literatures are perhaps too vast to give complete justice to here. In some ways, our study is closely a¢ liated with a few recent approaches to use executive compensation structures to predict corporate disclosure. Ke (2003) , for example, …nds that CEOs who hold more stock options and stocks are more likely to report longer strings of consecutive earnings increase, especially for …rms whose stock prices are historically sensitive to earnings reports. A number of other studies contain similar …ndings. 11 In perhaps the most closely related paper to ours, Johnson, Ryan & Tian (2003) …nd that incentive-based compensation and the exercise of lucrative options is signi…cantly more common in …rms who are subject to SEC enforcement releases. This study complements theirs in coming to similar …ndings with private securities class action, but also di¤ers in other ways. Indeed, our study not only formulates theoretical model to frame the interaction of executive compensation with other incentive mechanisms, but we also estimate one of the principal costs to misreporting (in the form of securities litigation settlements). Another strand of papers attempts to estimate the impact of the PSLRA on "meritorious"cases using litigation data (e.g., 2002; Choi 2004 ). The results from these studies are not mutually consistent with one another, due perhaps to the di¢ culty in forming clean predictions about how the Reform Act should have a¤ected observable litigation choices. 12 (We detail this di¢ culty in the theoretical section of this paper). Our analysis, in contrast, attempts to test for the e¤ects of legal reform not by analyzing the observable changes in litigation activity directly, but rather in considering how the Reform Act was e¤ectively "priced out" in executive compensation contracts. 9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2003) (prohibiting auditors from providing non-auditing services to clients); SOX § 301 (requiring each member of the audit committee of a listed company to be independent); NYSE Listing Requirements; Final Corporate Governance Rules (November 2003) (requiring majority board independence). 1 2 See, e.g., Bernardo et al. (2000) . 1 3 Helland (2004) analyzes the merits of securities class actions using reputations as a proxy for legitimate suits. He …nds that, for the most part, securities fraud litigation appears to have little e¤ect on future directorships of defendants. Only in the larger quartile of settlements, or in cases where the SEC has also brought an action does there appear to be much of a relationship. Our results, however, suggest that securities fraud litigation does have some interplay with other mechanisms of corporate governance -consitent with private class actions having some e¤ect.
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This remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model and derives the structural substitutability of compensation with corporate governance structures, as well as the structural complementarity of incentive compensation with securities litigation. We also demonstrate in this section some of the challenges for detecting these inter-relationships empirically. Section 3 turns to our empirical strategy for testing our framework, and estimates the magnitude of the substitutability and complementarity hypotheses described above. Section 4 concludes.
A Model of Governance, Compensation and Litigation
Because the relationship between governance, compensation and litigation is a complex one, a sound empirical strategy for measuring their mutual relationship virtually necessitates developing some sort of theory about their interrelationship. In this section of the paper, we do just that, considering more formally how corporate governance, executive compensation and securities litigation interact with one another in a game-theoretic framework of optimal organizational design. As noted in the introduction, it is often not clear on a priori grounds whether these incentive devices are properly seen as mutual complements, substitutes, or neither. The model presented below, therefore, attempts to formalize these concepts, and propose when, as a matter of prediction, each account will hold true. In developing this theoretical framework, it is important that it capture certain features of the institutional environment. First, and most importantly, all three instruments (governance, compensation and litigation) must at least potentially have a role in shaping incentives. If one of them were systematically excluded from our analysis, we would be unlikely to uncover interesting mutual interrelationships between them. Second, each of these factors should enter in a theoretically distinct way. For example, implementing good corporate governance is perhaps best seen as a type of ex ante protection against future misfeasance, allowing shareholders (at some cost) to dampen the incentives that corporate …duciaries might otherwise have to engage in self-serving behavior. Executive compensation, tends to work at an interim stage, rewarding executives when various benchmarks of anticipated performance are met (usually as re ‡ected through stock price). Litigation, in contrast, operates ex post, when relatively reliable indicators of the …rm's performance belie the earlier benchmarks. Finally, our model should allow for the endogeneity of institutional design, in particular the structure of the executive's contract and Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) analyze a model of corporate misreprorting. They argue that both incentive compensation and …nancing decisions may give managers an incentive to misreport. Their model treats the legal process as an exogenous environment, while ours anctually models litigation endogenously. Moreover, their model does not consider the fact that compensation packages themselves are set endogenously, and instead simply assumes exogenous share holdings. 6 the nature of the …rm's governance structure. Companies are generally free to design these packages in a way that best maximizes expected …rm value. 14 
Framework
Consider a business organization (or "…rm") owned by a risk-neutral Principal, denoted by B (and periodically referred to as "he"), representing a continuum of disaggregated shareholders. The principal is assumed unable (or unmotivated) to run the …rm himself, and he therefore retains a risk-neutral agent, denoted by A (and periodically referred to as "she"), to manage the …rm. We assume A possesses a stock of …nancial/reputational wealth given by W; and in addition can procure a reservation wage of ! by contracting with one of the …rm's competitors.
The manager makes an unobservable choice about how to run the …rm, which we denote by the variable e 2 f0; 1g, and which corresponds to either "working hard"(e = 1), or "shirking"(e = 0). The net di¤erence between the two is that hard work is relatively more costly to the manager, but it also yields a higher payo¤ to B. Explicitly, the manager always incurs a cost of c 1 to run the company while working hard, but shirking allows her to procure an additional bene…t that would otherwise be unavailable, reducing her net cost toĉ < c.
From the principal's perspective, A's management choice matters because shirking increases the chances that B will obtain a low gross payo¤ (V L ) instead of a high gross payo¤ (V H > V L ) : The probability of each payo¤ type conditional decision is given by the following table. By assumption, p 1 > p 0 :
Throughout the analysis that follows, we shall impose the restriction that shirking is never optimal: that is, expected returns to high e¤ort, (p 1 p 0 ) (V H V H ) ; are su¢ ciently large that the …rm always prefers to incentivize the manager to work hard rather than allowing her to shirk. 15 Thus far, our framework more or less resembles a conventional moral hazard model. To it, we now add elements pertaining both to governance and to securities fraud litigation. Let us …rst attend to corporate governance. In our view, a predominant bene…t of implementing a "good" corporate governance regime is that it allows for more direct monitoring of the agent, putting shareholders in a better position to assess directly the executive's activities and react thereto, thereby having the functional e¤ect of reducing the attainable bene…ts from shirking. In this spirit, we suppose that the principal can choose the intensity of the …rm's corporate governance structure, a choice we denote by the variable . Increasing -i.e., enhancing corporate governance protections -has the e¤ect of dampening the bene…ts that A derives from shirking. In particular, we assume that under governance structure ; the bene…t from shirking is given by the function ( ), where (0) > 0; (1) = 0; 0 ( ) < 0; and 00 ( ) > 0: Consequently, the net cost associated with shirking reduces toĉ = c ( ) : Although the properties above are all that are necessary for our results, we will put some structure on ( ) ; and assume that it has the following functional form:
While it dampens agency costs, installing a high level of corporate governance is not costless. Direct monitoring of management carries with it both an opportunity cost (of shareholders'time) and a certain loss in organizational ‡exibility in the company. To re ‡ect these costs, then, we assume that the …rm faces a constant marginal cost of a of installing corporate governance, so that the total cost of governance system is given by a : Now consider the e¤ects of securities fraud. In a world where shareholders always learn the true state of the world (i.e., V H or V L ) early on, securities fraud would never be a problem. Shareholders would simply wait for the state of the world to materialize, and compensate managers appropriately. In the real world, however, the "true" realization of V i is hard for B to observe in the short term, either because it is not yet known, because it is knowable but prohibitively expensive to learn about, because it is highly diluted with other information about the company, and so forth. In such a situation, securities markets will often depend on managers'representations about the health of the …rm (in the form of earnings forecasts, MD&As, press releases, and so forth). And it is these representations, in turn, that can ignite future securities fraud claims. In this spirit, we assume that during the relevant time period that sets A's compensation, the true state of the world is generally not publicly known. 16 However, after the manager has chosen her e¤ort level, she observes a signal about the …rm's prospective outcome, denoted by 2 fL; Hg. The signal is assumed to be unbiased, but imprecise. In particular, suppose the agent has expended e¤ort level e; with associated success probability of p e : With probability q the agent observes the true state of the world; but with probability (1 q) the agent observes an uninformative signal. The conditional distribution of the agent's signal, then, is given in the table below:
Note from the table that q 2 [0; 1] is tantamount to the precision of the agent's signal, so that we allow to range from being complete noise to completely informative. Also note that the unconditional probabilities of receiving signals L and H are (1 p e ) and p e ; respectively; thus, is an unbiased signal about future outcomes. 17 Critically, we assume that while is observable only to the manager, she makes a public disclosure about its content. She may choose to misrepresent the signal if, for example, her compensation package awards her with signi…cant incentive compensation upon news of a good state of the world. On the other hand, she may choose to reveal truthfully if dishonesty imposes a signi…cantly greater litigation risk on her. We therefore assume that B does not directly observe ; but rather observe^ ; where^ 2 fL; Hg denotes A's representations about the signal she has observed. 18 Should A contract with the …rm, then, her compensation consists of the pair fw; g ; where w represents a ‡at wage, and is a bonus payment that A receives if^ = H.
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Once the agent has disclosed^ ; and received her compensation, there is a small (exogenous) probability that the true state of the world will be revealed. In those situations where a low outcome has been revealed (V = V L ) following an optimistic disclosure by A (^ = H), a possibility for a securities fraud suit exists. Mirroring the actual contours of securities fraud law, we assume that not all shareholders have standing to sue; rather, it is only those shareholders who purchased or sold shares during the period of the fraud who are able to …le private securities fraud actions. In particular, we suppose that just after the manager's disclosure, a proportion of existing shareholders are forced to sell their shares for liquidity reasons. Under current law, the new owners of those sold shares have the right to bring private securities fraud litigation. The pershare damages such a suit for each suing plainti¤ is presumed to be given by a parameter Ddx; so that the total damages at stake are equal to D: We assume that this value is su¢ ciently "large"that it exceeds the manager's resources for 1 7 Moreover, the unbiasedness of the signal implies that the reverse conditional probabilities also match the conditional probabilities given in the table. And thus, the reverse conditionals are:
In many situations (e.g., disclosure items that are not required but are subject to securities fraud provisions -such as earnings projections), the agent my have a third choice of not disclosing anything. Within our framework, however, such a decision is tantamount to disclosing a low state of the world, and we therefore treat it as such.
For more on the necessity of "soft" determinations for executive compensation, see Murphy & Oyer (2003) . 1 9 The reader will note that turns on A's disclosure^ rather than the actual state of the world. Because the true state of the world is not generally known, incentive-based compensation decisions must necessarily be predicated on^ . As will become apparent below, the incentives faced by the manager may further be distorted in the event that shareholders …le securities fraud suits in those instances where the realized state of the world con ‡icts with the manager's disclosure.
paying the award (W + w + ), so that damages in excess of the manager's resources must come (if at all) from the corporation. 20 Should new shareholders decide to bring suit, the judicial process will determine liability. Although we do not model the litigation process as perfect (indeed, far from it), we do suppose that the process has at least some ability to distinguish between the two contexts in which a low state of the world might come about after an optimistic disclosure by the manager. They are as follows:
1. Truthful (but unlucky) reporting: fV = V L ; = H;^ = Hg . First, the agent may truthfully report a high signal, but the signal proves inaccurate. At the time the agent observes the signal (and reports it truthfully), the probability of this course of events is (1 q) (1 p i ) : By de…nition, a lawsuit under these circumstances would be non-meritorious. We assume that such suits nonetheless prevail with probability 0 > 0:
The second context occurs when A commits fraud, covering up an accurate signal of = L. Contingent on learning the signal (and reporting it untruthfully), this situation occurs with probability (q + (1 q) (1 p i )) : We assume that such suits win with probability 1 0 :
The special case of 1 = 0 corresponds to a situation in which courts are wholly incompetent, unable to discern between meritorious and frivolous suits. Conversely the special case of 1 = 1 and 0 = 0 corresponds to a situation in which courts are omniscient. We presume that an accurate description of the judicial system lies somewhere in between these two extremes, such that 0 < 0 < 1 < 1 (though our framework allows for all possibilities). We assume that each side bears costs of k should litigation occur, but that before trial occurs, they converge on perfect information about one another and thus the trial's likely outcome. Assuming they bargain Nash, they will settle at precisely the expected value for the suit. 21 Collectively, the disclosure and litigation behavior of the parties constitute a continuation game which we denote by ( L ; H ; ) : The relevant strategies that comprise are as follows. Upon observing the = L, we suppose that the Agent reports^ = H with probability L and^ = L with probability (1 L ) : Similarly, when A observes = H; he reports^ = H with probability H and = L with probability (1 H ) : Finally, when the shareholders observe a low 2 0 For example, one natural way to endogenize damages would be to presume per-share damages of
which corresponds to the di¤erence in price between a …rm in which the true signal is known to be = H and one in which the true signal is known to be = L: 2 1 The alert reader will note that our assumption about settlement yields the same prediction as would a model of litigation with no litigation costs (beyond …ling costs). We do not consider more elaborate (and less e¢ cient) settlement processes in this model both for tractability and because virtually no securities class actions actually reach litigated outcomes. As such, this assumption seems warranted.
true realization, as well as a previous report of^ = H; they …le a lawsuit with probability : We denote the set of equilibria to as B ( ).
We summarize the choice variables and parametric variables in a (relatively) concise In order to facilitate later analysis, it will prove helpful to de…ne the function R A ( ), which denotes the expected continuation payo¤ of the agent (in equilibrium) once she has received signal :
In addition, it will prove helpful to de…ne the function R SH (V L ) ; which denotes the expected net payo¤s of the plainti¤ shareholders after the state of the world is revealed to be low following an optimistic report by the agent.
Organizational Design Problem
The organizational design task for the …rm is to choose both a wage package fw; g and a governance level for the …rm in a way that maximizes …rm value, keeping in mind the underlying strategic incentives that the relevant players have (which are likely to be responsive to the organizational decisions the …rm makes). Formally, the design problem is as follows 22 :
Exp ected Incentive Pay s:t:
Although the …rm's objective is relatively straightforward, the three constraints deserve more mention. The individual rationality (IR) constraint states essentially that the agent must …nd it optimal to work at the …rm regardless of the current state of the world. In particular, the agent must prefer working to quitting even in the worst case scenario where she has observed a pessimistic signal, issued an optimistic report, and a suit has been …led. The incentive compatibility (IC) constraint states that the …rm's organizational structure must be such that the agent when working …nds it optimal to work hard rather than to shirk. As noted above, we suppose throughout our analysis that the stakes for the …rm are su¢ ciently high that it always …nds incentivizing the agent to be optimal. Finally, the equilibrium (EQ) constraint requires that from the point at which A makes disclosure^ ; the actions of the parties must be part of a noncooperative equilibrium. As noted above, the downstream litigation behavior of the parties is presumed to be outside of the realm of contracting (although the incentives provided by the …rm's organizational choices may indirectly a¤ect how downstream litigation plays out).
Analysis of Constraints
We begin by analyzing the e¤ects of the three constraints noted above, and what they imply for the …rm's feasible set of organizational choices.
Individual Rationality Constraint (IR)
Typical of most of these sorts of problems, the (IR) constraint will turn out to be binding. Indeed, if it were not, an optimal solution to any agency problem with transferrable utility would be simply to sell the …rm to the agent. Given that the agent is assumed to be liquidity constrained, that cannot occur in this context. Simpli…cation of the (IR) constraint yields the following condition (which holds at equality when the (IR) constraint is binding):
In other words, the wage component of the agent's compensation package is set equal to her opportunity wage in the outside labor market. We shall impose this condition throughout what follows.
Incentive Compatibility Constraint (IC)
Now consider the incentive compatibility constraint. This constraint also turns out to be binding so long as incentivizing the agent to work hard is in the principal's interests. Simplifying the (IC) constraint yields the following condition (which also holds at equality when binding):
Equilibrium Constraint (EQ)
Finally, consider the equilibrium constraint. In particular, we wish to characterize the equilibrium behavior of the parties in the continuation game starting with the agent's receipt of the signal ; and assuming that the agent's compensation package is such that he has previously participated and has not shirked. The equilibrium pro…le of the continuation game 23 can be summarized by a strategy pro…le f L ; H ; g such that each respective strategy optimizes the payo¤s (respectively) of the agent that has observed signal = H (hereinafter referred to as the "high type" agent), the agent that has observed the signal = L (hereinafter referred to as the "low type" agent); and the plainti¤s, who have only observed the reported signal^ and the state of the world V: 24 A modest but realistic parametric restriction on Y both simpli…es our analysis and generates the most interesting and plausible family of equilibria. Explicitly, consider the following assumption about Y in what follows:
The discussion that follows generally employs the solution consept of bayesian perfect equilibrium, implementing re…nements such as sequentiality, the intuitive criterion and divinity when numerous equilibria exist. 2 4 Because the expected payo¤ for reporting^ = H are larger for the agent who actually observes = H; we can constrain our attention to situations where H L :
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The intuitive content of Assumption 1 is relatively simple. It states that plainti¤s in securities fraud cases are always at least potentially on the extensive margin in formulating their …ling strategy. In particular, …ling costs are su¢ ciently low that a plainti¤ would always wish to pursue litigation if he knew that the agent always made an optimistic report regardless of her true information (that is H = L = 1). This corresponds to the condition that Y Y 1 : On the other hand, Assumption 1 states that …ling costs are su¢ ciently high that the plainti¤ would not pursue litigation if she believed fraud to be wholly absent from the system (that is L = 0). This corresponds to the condition that Y Y 0 :Not only is this restriction plausible, but it also comports with our observations about the real world. Indeed, if Y < Y 0 ; every …rm who experienced bad news would be sued (in reality, only about 7% are). Conversely, if Y > Y 1 ; no …rm would ever be sued for securities fraud, which we also know not to be true.
Given optimal …ling behavior of plainti¤s as speci…ed above, and subject to Assumption 1, we are now in a position to solve for the agent's optimal disclosure strategy and fully characterize the equilibrium of the continuation game. Explicitly, there is a unique Bayesian perfect equilibrium to the litigation game which falls into one of two qualitative types, depending on the relative value of : The equilibrium of the litigation game is given in the following Proposition, whose proof can be found in the appendix:
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1, the unique equilibrium of the litigation game is given by:
Proposition 1 states that the equilibrium of the litigation game turns crucially on the value of the agent's incentive compensation. When is relatively modest ( 1 ), the unique equilibrium involves mixed strategies for both the low type agent and the litigating shareholders. Note that the probability of …ling suit, ; increases in over this range, re ‡ecting the fact that larger values of make securities fraud more tempting, and thereby increasing the chances of suit after a bad state of the world is revealed following an optimistic report.
Given the equilibrium stated in Proposition 1, it is relatively straight-forward to compute the equilibrium payo¤s of the continuation game for each agent type. They are as follows (again, as judged from the point at which the actor moves).
Note from the agent's payo¤ functions that the e¤ect of both the noisy observance of the outcome and of noisy litigation is that they jointly dilute the power of incentive compensation, so that the incremental payo¤ from a high signal is less than : This means that incentivizing the agent to expend high e¤ort will be more costly than in a world where the true realized state of the world were always observable. 25 
Optimal Organizational Design
From the analysis above, it is now possible to restate ( ) to re ‡ect the equilibrium strategy pro…les in the litigation continuation game.
Before presenting the actual terms of an optimal contract, simple analysis of the constraints yields some interesting …ndings about the ability of compensation, governance, and litigation to complement or substitute for each other. Note from the (IC 0 ) constraint that and always move in an inverse relation to one another. This suggests that at least when one holds other parameters constant, compensation and governance should be policy substitutes for one another: ceteris paribus, the more invasive a …rm's corporate governance regime, the lower the power of the …rm's incentive structure. Second, as noted brie ‡y above, (EQ 0 ) implies that as increases, so does the probability of suit ( ) increases as well. In other words, as an executive's incentive compensation becomes more high-powered, so does the credibility of the litigation threat. This suggests that litigation and compensation are structural complements with one another -litigation is likely to play a larger disciplining role when incentive compensation is large. Combining (IC 0 ) and (EQ 0 ) ; then, we immediately arrive at the conclusion that corporate governance and litigation are policy substitutes: the less invasive a …rm's corporate governance regime, the greater the likelihood that the …rm will face securities litigation as a form of ex post discipline. Note, however, that this last relationship occurs indirectly -as a¤ects , which in turn a¤ects the likelihood of suit.
Analysis of this problem allows us to specify the terms of the optimal contract and corporate governance regime as a function of the fundamental parameters 2 5 We note also in passing that:
Thus, increasing has the e¤ect of increasing incentives, but not by as much as it would if all information were revealed to the public and / or courts were perfectly accurate.
of the model. We state these terms in Proposition 2, whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 2: If Assumption 1 holds, and if
is su¢ ciently large, the optimal contract and governance structure for the …rm is unique and is given by:
The conditions assumed to generate Proposition 2 are relatively mild and related to one another. First, as before, Assumption 1 implies that …ling costs are in a su¢ ciently "moderate"range that litigation is neither totally absent nor ubiquitous. Second, the Proposition's result is conditional on the executive's disposable wealth being relatively large compared to the marginal cost of e¤ort. The rationale behind this condition is that if the executive is close to judgment proof, the threat of litigation will have a relatively small deterrent e¤ect, thereby necessitating enormous incentive contracts (which would once again ensure that litigation is ubiquitous).
Perhaps the more interesting aspects of Proposition 2 are the qualitative comparative statics that it generates, which will provide the basis for our empirical estimations in the next section. These comparative statics are in tabular form through Corollary 2.1: Corollary 2.1: In equilibrium, and under the terms of the optimal contract, the following comparative statics hold:
Examination of the table from Corollary 2.1 reveals a number of interesting predictions. First, recall from the analysis of the constraints above that (a) executive compensation and corporate governance are structural substitutes while (b) executive compensation and litigation are structural complements, holding other variables constant. However, a simple correlational analysis of the three would not necessarily reveal this structural relationship. For example, if a signi…cant component of variation across …rms concerned di¤erences in the success rates of their operational endeavors (p 0 or p 1 ); then strong corporate governance and signi…cant incentive compensation would appear to have a positive (rather than negative) correlation. Identifying whether the posited structural substitutability of the two requires accounting for the endogenous e¤ects of these (often unobserved) variables. Second, the model predicts that the underlying incidence of fraud ( L ) will increase as the plainti¤'s …ling costs increase, or as the plainti¤'s claimable damages decrease. This makes sense, given that high …ling costs and low damages make the plainti¤'s threat of litigation less credible. Somewhat more interestingly, the incidence of fraud tends to decrease as the agent's signal becomes more precise, due to the fact that disappointed shareholders are more likely to attribute an unpleasant surprise to fraud rather than simple bad luck (see, e.g.., Bernardo et al. (2000)).. Finally, the underlying incidence of fraud decreases as the likelihood of liability from either a non-meritorious ( 0 ) or meritorious ( 1 ) suit increases. While the latter e¤ect seems intuitive, the former is a bit surprising. The intuition behind it is that an increase in the chances for liability from a non-meritorious suit still encourages purchasing shareholders to …le suit whenever V L is revealed, since they do not know whether the defendant actually misreported at the time that they …le. This greater litigiousness has a deterrent e¤ect on the low-signal agent type, who is more responsive to litigation incentives.
Finally, an intriguing aspect of the table above is that it reveals how changes in legal doctrine might be measured not by looking at litigation activity alone (which is itself often fraught with indeterminacy), but rather by focusing elsewhere, and considering e¤ects on complementary incentive structures. In particular, note from the table that changes in the liability parameters 1 and 0 have ambiguous e¤ects on the predicted unconditional likelihood of class actions (column [7] ). Thus, it is di¢ cult to interpret whether any signi…cant legal change has occurred strictly by examining post-reform propensities to litigate. On the other hand, executive compensation appears to increase unambiguously in 0 and decrease unambiguously in 1 : This makes relatively good sense, given that an increase in 0 imposes a greater risk of liability even on a manager doing an honest job, thereby necessitating larger executive compensation, while an increase in 1 allows shareholders to depend relatively more on ex post litigation as a deterrence mechanism, thereby reducing incentive compensation.
Testing the Model

Data
In order to employ our model empirically, it was necessary to assemble a data set that included …rm-level observations on corporate governance, executive compensation, and securities litigation. The data set we use for our analysis is a …rm level cross sectional unbalanced panel. It includes 12,840 observations on 2188 di¤erent …rms during the period 1992-2002. 434 …rms have only one record within the data set, but 265 …rms would form a full panel, i.e. 11 measurements per …rm. The data constitutes an inclusive merger of several data sets: In particular, CompuStat's ExecuComp data set, the Corporate Governance Provision data set of the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), and Securities Class Action Alert Service of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). In addition, we added industry-level data organized by NAICS (North American Industrial Classi…cation System) number using Compustat's Price, Earnings and Dividends database. To acquire traded stock volumes per month we use Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP's) database on securities price, return and volume.
Executive Compensation Data
Standard & Poor's ExecuComp data set includes 159,141 observations on total compensation, and all of its components, of the top …ve executives from current or historical S&P 1500 …rms from 1992 to 2002. The data set includes variables on total compensation, as well as short-term compensation such as salary, bonus and other annual payments. It also includes variables on long term compensation, which we de…ne as incentive compensation, i.e. the sum of the current year aggregate value of the stock options granted to the executive during the year as valued by S&P's Black-Scholes methodology, the current year dollar value of restricted stocks granted during the year, the amount paid out to the executive under the company's long term incentive plan (usually three year plans), and all other total pay. The ExecuComp data set is furthermore a data source for market price volatility and variables on the size of the company such as number of employees in a …rm.
A representative summary of observations on executive compensation (for the year 2002) appear in the table below:
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
In order to classify …rms within the North American Classi…cation System we merged CompuStat's Price, Earnings and Dividends data set by 6-digit CUSIP number, an identi…cation number for each …rm. No observations were lost during this merge and the data set comprised 118,141 observations. The ExecuComp data set has multiple observations on CEO compensation each year, due to di¤erent exercise dates on di¤erent stock options granted each year. We aggregated those observations together into one measure, per CEO-year. About 41,000 observations were discarded for that purpose.
One of the more important variables for consideration in our problem will be the proportion of the chief executive's total compensation that consists of longterm incentive compensation +w . The …gure below presents a histogram of long-term compensation across all …rms in our data set. Note from the …gure that while there are a number of companies that pay either no incentive compensation or a small amount (around 9% of our sample), the distribution is otherwise evenly spread throughout all possible values, including over 4 % of …rms in which the CEO's compensation consists of more than 90% incentive compensation. Figure 1 
Corporate Governance
To capture corporate governance levels, we utilize a data set collected by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which includes detailed listings of corporate governance provision for individual …rms published in Corporate Takeover Defenses. The data are derived from various public sources, such as corporate bylaws and charters, proxy statements and annual reports of …rms from the Standard & Poor's 500 index as well as annual lists of the largest corporations in the publication of Fortune, Forbes and Business Week. The IRRC sample holds 10,121 observations including measurements at the …rm level over the years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002 . When merging the ExecuComp data set with the IRRC, about 3,665 observations in the IRRC did not correspond to the ExecuComp data set, hence we were left with 39,255 observations.
Due to the gaps in the IRRC data set, we estimate the missing values in the years 1992,1994,1996,1997,1999 and 2001 with a linear interpolation, for all variables in the IRRC data set. Gompers et al. (2003) use this same data set to formulate a governance "index" by summing these variables, which give them a form of ranking from democratic on the low end to dictatorial on the high end. In order to facilitate interpretations, we reverse their order, so that lower index numbers are tantamount to those …rms that would be thought of conventionally as having "weak" corporate governance, and …rms with higher indices corresponding to "strong"governance …rms. This table provides the …ve number summary of the corporate governance index distribution over time.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Securities Litigation
The SCAA/SCAS database includes 3286 class actions, principally …led within federal court by private plainti¤s (though some SEC or state court cases manage to leak in and were dropped), against individual(s), a …rm or multiple …rms of which …ling date occurs during the period January 1990 to March 2004. Class action litigation against multiple …rms were broken up; hence each class action is held against one …rm only in our data set, resulting in 3,783 cases against 3,083 di¤erent …rms. If a …rm was being sued multiple times in a single year, those suits were collapsed together in one suit per year per …rm, where the sum of all settlement funds resulting from multiple suits within a year was recorded in a separate variable as well as the maximum settlement amount during the year. 361 observations were discarded due to multiple suits in a single year.
When merging the ExecuComp-IRRC data set with SCAS, 322 cases survived the merge. A total of 103 of these suits eventually procured settlements that exceeded $1 million. Table 3 reports the number of …rms who sued in each year of our data set for which we also have full information on governance and executive compensation. If same …rm has been sued multiple times per year we only observe one suit per year per …rm. The numbers are derived from our merged data set comprised of S&P's ExecuComp, IRRC Corporate Governance Provision, and ISS Securities Class Action Services data set.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
While a number of features of securities litigation are worth independent consideration, a signi…cant reform that took place in 1996 is perhaps worthy of particular mention. In December 1995, Congress overrode a presidential veto to enact the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). 26 The Act, which became e¤ective in January 1996, altered discernibly the substantive and procedural hurdles for …ling a securities class action under federal law. Although the PSLRA's procedural reforms were multi-faceted, virtually all of them had the intent and e¤ect of advantaging securities fraud defendants relative to the status quo ante. For instance, the Act requires plainti¤s who seek money damages now to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind for the underlying o¤ense (1934 Act § 21D(b)(2)). Moreover, most circuit courts have interpreted the Act as elevating the scienter requirement itself, and many now mandate that the plainti¤ speci…cally allege and prove an extreme form of recklessness, and even a knowing state of mind in cases involving forward-looking statements within the Act's safe-harbor provision. 27 Additionally, the PSLRA requires (among other things) a mandatory stay on all pre-trial discovery pending the resolution of any motions to dismiss. 28 A principal articulated purpose of the PSLRA was to reduce litigation rates by eliminating non-meritorious suits while leaving meritorious suits una¤ected. 29 We shall return to the question of whether the Reform Act succeeded in its articulated goals below.
Testing the Model' s Predictions
One of the stronger predictions of the analytical model presented in Section 2 was that executive compensation and corporate governance are likely to be structural substitutes of one another, so that stronger corporate governance systems would predict weaker incentive schemes (and vice versa). At the same time, the model also predicts that executive compensation and litigation are likely to be structural complements, so that ceteris paribus, higher powered incentive schemes are likely to induce more frequent litigation. Table 4 presents a simple pair-wise correlation matrix comparing each of these three measures. Note from the table that the predicted relationships appear to hold. As the table demonstrates, corporate governance score is negatively correlated to long-term incentive compensation, but positively correlated with later litigation. 30 2 7 The Act imposes a "safe harbor" for any forward-looking projection that also conveys meaningful cautionary language about the potential lack of accuracy of such projections. This safe harbor applies regardless of whether the private action is brought the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 1933 Act § 27A; 1934 Act § 21E. As to cases not involving forward-looking statements, the exact quantum of scienter required has become an item of disagreement among the Circuit Courts. The Second and Third Circuits require that a plainti¤ plead recklessness, but deem the test to be satis…ed circumstantially if the plainti¤ can allege with speci…city that the defendant had a clear motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud. Donald Press, et al. v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., et al., 166 F.3d 529 (2nd. Cir. 1999); In Re: Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, 180 F.3d 525 (3rd Cir. 1999). This test was considered to be the most restrictive in the country before PSLRA, but now may be the weakest. The Sixth Circuit has adopted a more stringent test, requiring direct proof su¢ cient to create "a strong inference of reckless behavior" and disallowing circumstantial proof. In Re: Comshare, Incorporated Securities Litigation, 1999 WL 460917, Fed.Sec.L.Rep. 90,513. Finally, the Ninth Circuit has adopted the harshest test of all, also disallowing circumstantial proof and requiring that the plainti¤ establish "deliberate or conscious recklessness."In Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 1999 WL 595194, Fed.Sec.L.Rep. P90,512, 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6339 (9th Cir. 1999). 2 8 In addition to these reforms, the PSLRA also mandated proportional (rather than joint and several) liability for all but knowing violations of law, and mandated that courts conduct a "Rule 11" inquiry as a matter of course at the end of an action. 2 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
While these simple correlations are informative, they are somewhat misleading. Indeed, as Corollary 2.1 demonstrates, the predicted empirical relationship among the three variables of interest need not always square with their structural relationship. Thus, a more systematic approach is appropriate. Table  5 focuses on the relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation, considering various types of linear estimation. The …rst panel of the table estimates ordinary least squares and random e¤ects models with incentive compensation as the dependant variable. The second panel treats corporate governance as the dependent variable, with the …nal model attempting to control for the endogeneity of incentive pay by using industry dummies, …rm size and an executive's non-incentive salary as instruments for long-term incentive share.
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Note that in all cases, incentive compensation and corporate governance have negative a relationship to one another, and always signi…cant at least at the 10% level (or 5% level on a one tailed test). Moreover, it is notable that the strongest negative relationship between incentive pay and corporate governance emerges in the …nal model of the table, in which instruments are used to control for the endogeneity of executive compensation. This result is comfortably consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model, at least insofar as the relationship between governance and compensation is concerned.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Turning to the predicted relationship between compensation and litigation, consider Table 6 , which focuses on the likelihood of suit in any given year of the data set as a function of controls. To account for the fact that fraud (or alleged fraud) often takes some time for plainti¤s to uncover, and that plainti¤s face between one and three years after discovery to …le suit, we use one year lags of incentive pay, volume, volatility, and size as regressors. We also introduce an indicator variable (After PSLRA) that takes on the value of 1 if the suit was …led after the promulgation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Panel A reports OLS regressions, for various event horizons. Panel B reports a linear probability model in which size and salary variables are used to instrument for incentive compensation. Panel C replicates Panel A but with a logit regression structure, and reports coe¢ cients in odds ratios. Note that the coe¢ cient on incentive compensation is positive and statistically signi…cant in all speci…cations, and thus higher executive compensation predicts higher litigation rates. Moreover, the economic signi…cance of this e¤ect, while relatively mild in the OLS approach, grows tremendously in the IV speci…cation. Indeed, in Panel B, the coe¢ cient on Incentive Pay is consistently between .23 and.35, suggesting that each 1% increase in incentive compensation ratios leads to approximately a 0.3% larger probability of suit. While this may appear small on …rst blush, it can add up -indeed, comparing the lowest decile of executive compensation packages to the highest, this translates to between an 18% and 28% larger likelihood of facing securities litigation.
Note also from the Table that the introduction of the PSLRA did not appear to have a signi…cant independent e¤ect on the likelihood of litigation. Indeed, the indicator variable for the post-PSLRA period rarely tests signi…cant and is of generally small magnitudes. However, the cross product between this indicator and lagged volatility suggests that the PSLRA has had an e¤ect of partially dampening the e¤ects that volatility has on the incidence of litigation. (At the same time, this dampening e¤ect appears to disappear when instruments are used for incentive compensation). The generally ambiguous e¤ects of PSLRA as measured by litigation rates should not be terribly surprising in light of the fact that Corollary 2.1 [7] similarly predicts ambiguous e¤ects on the unconditional probability of suit. Indeed, this ambiguity is precisely what makes measuring the e¤ect of the reform by examinging litigation activity itself a hazardous process.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
The apparently strong structural complementarity between incentive compensation and securities litigation induced us to consider one other speci…cation, in which we attempt to use incentive compensation not to predict the incidence of suit, but rather to predict expected settlement value of securities fraud cases (if any) brought against companies within our data set. The next table considers such a speci…cation, in which aggregate settlement value is the dependent variable. Note that since most of the …rms within our data set are not sued, and some that are sued win dismissals (or non-cash settlements), our dependent variable is truncated at zero, corresponding with the point at which securities litigation is either unsuccessful or never pursued. This form of truncation makes a Tobit estimation appropriate, and two speci…cations are reported in Table 7 . In both speci…cations, we employ two-stage estimation using our instruments to create predicted incentive pay, and then regress this prediction (and other regressors) on the truncated settlements. Our (still preliminary) results are surprisingly large. Overall, a 1% increase in the fraction of a CEO's pay that is comprised of incentive compensation leads to an increase in total settlement value of approximately $3.4 million. The introduction of the PSLRA apparently molli…ed this e¤ect, but came nowhere close to eliminating it.
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE
We are somewhat surprised at the economic signi…cance of this e¤ect, and robustness checks (still in process) may reveal the extent to which it is driven by anomalies within our data set (such as outliers). While some manipulations appear to reduce these estimates, they generally remain economically and statistically signi…cant. The resilience of these estimates -at least thus faris suggestive of the conclusion that executive compensation often comes with a cost -in this case the cost of increasing the probability of securities litigation and the expected damages that emanate therefrom. Whether bearing this cost is optimal or not, it should be one that corporate boards should be aware of in structuring executive compensation.
An alternative test of the PSLRA
In addition to the direct insights that our model has spawned above, the realization that governance, compensation and litigation may be systematically linked suggests that there may be novel ways to exploit these interrelationships empirically. For example, it may be possible to use our framework to conduct an indirect test of a legal change, whose direct e¤ects are di¢ cult to discern. Returning to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, as noted in both the introduction and demonstrated in the foregoing subsection, the selection of suits for trial and …ling often complicate empirical approaches for estimating the e¤ects of the reform. After the passage of the Act, it is likely that the relevant players reacted in numerous ways, thereby con ‡ating the theoretical predictions that one is capable of making. Going back to Corollary 2.1, for example, note that the unconditional probability of suit changes in ambiguous directions as the primary legal variables ( 1 and 0 ) change, re ‡ecting the feedback e¤ects that such a shock has on fraud rates, …ling rates, and organizational structure. Perhaps an alternative way, then, to understand the e¤ect of the reform is to consider how it a¤ected other dimensions of corporate behavior. In particular, note from Corollary 2.1 (column [3] ) that the executive's incentive compensation ratio, +w ; is strictly increasing in "false positives" due to non-meritorious suits ( 0 ), and strictly decreasing in "true positives" from truly meritorious suits ( 1 ) : One of the putative goals of the Reform Act was to decrease frivolous litigation without a¤ecting meritorious suits. Such a reform, then, would correspond to a decrease in 0 with no corresponding change in 1 : As such, the reform would be predicted to introduce a negative shock to executive incentive compensation ratios. This is a testable implication, and in Table 8 we attempt to provide such a test. The Table presents various random-e¤ects estimations in which incentive compensation constitutes the dependent variable. Among the control variables we include an indicator variable for the post-PSLRA period, and an interaction term between that indicator variable and the …rm's stock volatility. Note that the coe¢ cient on the post-PSLRA variable is positive and signi…cant, contrary to the predictions of our model if the representations about the reform act are presumed to be true. One interpretation of this …nding is that the Act was over-inclusive: while it may have had the e¤ect of discouraging frivolous litigation (reducing 0 ), it also had the e¤ect of discouraging meritorious litigation (reducing 1 ). If the latter e¤ect is stronger than the former, then it would be unsurprising to see the reported coe¢ cient.
Note as well from Table 8 that the e¤ects of the PSLRA appear to have depended on whether the stock at issue was a low or high volatility stock. The negative coe¢ cient on the interaction term suggests that the act may have come closer to its intended e¤ects for stocks that have high volatility. It is in those situations that the stakes from a successful suit are likely to be the largest, thereby enhancing the incentive to …le non-meritorious litigation. For lower volatility stocks, on the other hand, private litigation stakes are smaller, making litigation relatively more expensive for plainti¤s who do not have meritorious cases.
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Although not included in the table, the results of the table are robust to the inclusion of linear and quadratic time trends, which helps to control for the e¤ects of unobserved variables that likely induced greater executive compensation levels in the 1990s. Even so, of course, it is di¢ cult to tease out causal relationships from tables such as that above, and we are currently in the process of shoring up this result with other approaches that may be more suggestive of causality. Although not reported here in tabular form, we have estimated autoregressive speci…cations of the compensation equation to test whether passage of the PSLRA fails to "Granger" cause incentive structure.
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Here we have found similar e¤ects, rejecting the null hypothesis of no Granger causaility, and similarly …nding that e¤ectiveness and lagged e¤ectiveness of the PSLRA predicts increases in incentive compensation. 33 We are currently pursuing other methods of teasing out causality, such as inclusion of control group …rms and joint dependent variable estimation, and will report on those tests in subsequent drafts.
Conclusion
In this paper we constructed an agency cost model of the …rm to study how three central mechanisms of managerial incentives -corporate governance protections, executive compensation levels, and litigation endogenously interact with one another. The framework predicts that incentive pay and governance are likely to be structural substitutes with one another, while compensation and shareholder litigation are likely to be structural complements. We veri…ed these predictions empirically, and then explored particular dimensions of them. In particular higher powered incentives appear to catalyze securities class action litigation. According to our estimates, each 1% increase in the incentive component of a CEO's contract predicts a 0.3% increase in a class action …ling and a $3.4 million dollar increase in expected settlement costs. In addition, we used our framework to formulate a test for the e¤ects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Our results appear inconsistent with the claims of the statute's proponents that the PSLRA systematically discouraged frivilous litigation without burdening meritorious claims. However, after introduction of the PSLRA, the responsiveness of settlement costs to incentive compensation was dampened somewhat (by approximately 20%).
Although we have not explored the issue at length here, the framework developed in this paper may be of assistance to policy analysts attempting to predict the e¤ects of new legal and regulatory reforms, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The SOX reforms have come under some degree of criticism for focusing on elements of corporate governance and executive compensation which historically have not been closely correlated with securities fraud. Our approach, however, would advise caution in leaping to such a conclusion. Indeed, an exogenous shock to all …rm's governance structures or compensation schemes would a¤ect incentives at the structural level (rather than reduced level). Consequently, the e¤ects of such a shock may be signi…cantly larger than historical analyses predict. This extension of our framework, however, is worthy of a paper all to itself, and we leave it to future work.
References 6 Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of propositions above.
Proof of Propositon 1:
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1, the unique equilibrium of the litigation game is given by f L ; H ; g where:
where 1
Proof: Application of Bayes rule and the posited equilibrium path to R B (V L ) generates the following lemma, which facilitates the proof of the Proposition:
Lemma 1: When a low state of the world is revealed following A's report of = H, the plainti¤ 's optimal …ling strategy is given by:
Now consider …rst the contingency where^ = H; but the actual state of the world is later revealed to be V L . As noted above, this outcome is assumed to be what generates securities litigation, and it can occur for two reasons: First, A might have observed = L; and but committed fraud (i.e.,^ = H), which she will do with probability L . Along the equilibrium path, the probability that this contingency occurs is:
where i = 0; 1 denotes whether the agent has previously shirked. Alternatively A might have observed = H and (truthfully) reported^ = H with probability H ; but is unlucky and the state of the world is revealed to be V L : This contingency occurs with equilibrium probability:
And thus:
Using Bayes rule, then, the probability that the state fV L ;^ = Hg has been reached because of fraud (rather than bad luck) is:
which results in liability with probability 1 :
The (complementary) probability that the state has been reached by bad luck is
which results in liability with probability 0 : Conseqently, the expected probability of liability is given by
and the expression in Lemma 1a simply discounts damages D by this probability, comparing it to …ling cost. QED The intuition behind Lemma 1 is relatively straightforward. It essentially states that if, under the posited equilibrium, the expected value of the suit exceeds …ling costs, shareholders will bring suit. If …ling costs fall short of expected damages, then shareholders will never bring suit. Finally, if …ling costs are exactly o¤set by expected damages, plainti¤s are indi¤erent between …ling suit and doing nothing, and are therefore willing to play a mixed strategy. Holding the strategies of other players constant, shareholders are more likely to …le suit when …ling costs (Y ) becomes small, per capita damages (D) grow large, the size of the class ( ) grows large, and the likelihood of litigation success against either a culpable or a honest agent ( 1 and 0 ; respectively) grows large.
Under assumption 1, it can never be the case that a low plainti¤ type adopts a pure strategy of truthful revelation -because then the equilibrium probability of suit is zero, and it is pro…table for the low type to deviate. Thus the only possibilities for equilibria are a partially mixed equilibrium and a pure strategy equilibrium in which all agent types report high and litigation always occurs. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, we can proceed to derive the appropriate conditions on L and that give rise to indi¤erence by those players. Letting
(1 p1)(1 q) ; the indi¤erence condition for the plainti¤s is:
The indi¤erence condition for the low type agent is:
However, this mixed equilibrium can exist only so long as L and as speci…ed above are in the interval (0; 1) : The condition on 1 ensures that this will be the case. This equilibrium occurs whenver = 0: Su¢ cient conditions are therefore:
Additional Continuation Equilibria
In this region, by construction = 0: Consequently, the …rm is unable to deter the agent from shirking, and the optimal contract is given by f!; 0; 0g : Because we have presumed that the optimal organizational structure is to induce high e¤ort, this equilibrium is never consistent with an optimal contract.
Equlibrium 4:
In this equilibrium, both the high and low signal receivers report a low signal. This occurs when the litigation threat is so grave that agents always want to sue whenever a low state occurs after a high outcome is reported -even in an equiilibrium where the agent always tells the truth. In other words, the 32 agent is so scared of litigation that he misleades in a pessimistic way. Su¢ cient conditions for this equilibrium to obtain are 34 :
This equilibrium occurs when low signal types are completely deterred, while high signal types tell the thruth. In this equilibrium all suits are non-meritorious. Su¢ cient conditions for this equilibrium to obtain are:
In this equilibrium, the high and low signal agent make optimistic reports, and the plainti¤s never sue when a low state is revealed. In this equilibrium, the low signal agent type always commits fraud. This equilibrium can occur whenever …ling costs are so high that a suit against A is unpro…table even when it's quite likely (bayesian posterior of q > 1 2 ) that the agent committed fraud. Su¢ cient conditions for this equilibrium to obtain are:
Summarizing, shareholders never …le suit even if they knew that A was committing fraud in h. Knowing this, it is easy to verify that A always commits fraud.
Summary
The table below summarizes all of the plausible equilibria f L ; H ; g of the game, depending on the parameters. The numbers in brackets denote the equilibrium type as described above .
35 3 4 Notice that in this equilibrium, no agent-type sends signal^ = H; and we must also specify o¤ equilibrium beliefs for this equilibriu. It turns out, however, that any set of o¤-equilibrium conjectures justi…es this equilibrium. 3 5 THere are some equilibria which we exclude for various reasons. For example, there is one in which f L ; H ; g = 0; H ; : But for this equilibrium to exist, however, it must be that Y = 0 D; which is not an interesting equilibrium because it requires exact equality on the litigation costs condition, which is unlikley to be met. Similarly, when Y 2 [Y 0 ; Y 1 ] and < 0 ; there is another sequential equilibrium in which f L ; H ; g = f0; 0; 1g : However, supporting this equilibrium requires that the plainti¤ have o¤ equilibrium beliefs that fail a divinity requirement. We therefore report only the one that survives such re…nement.
f0; 1; 0g [1] f0; 1; 0g [1] f0; 1; 0g [1] 2 (0; 0 ] f0; 0; 1g [4] (
f1; 1; 0g
f1; 1; 1g
[6c]
Proposition 2
Proposition 2: If Assumption 1, and if
is su¢ ciently large, the optimal contract and governance structure for the …rm are given by:
We subdivide the proof into two sections, each concerning subregions of :
Case 1:
1 : We begin our inquiry on the most interesting/plausible family of equilibria in which 1 : Recall that in this permutation, the constraints of the problem are given by:
Substituting these terms into our objective function allows us to restate the …rm's problem as follows:
where:
Maximizing yields:
As above, …rst consider the varius constraints under this permutation
which simpli…es the …rm's objective function to:
where
First order conditions for maximization in imply:
Interestingly, note that in this region there is a one-to-one tradeo¤ between incentive compensation and wage. Indeed, given that the agent always mis-reports and always claims the bonus in this region, there is no longer a unique compensation package, and instead it is a continuum of wage/incentive packages such that:
Uniqueness of Optimal Solution
Recall that by hypothesis 1 ; and that > 1 : In order to show uniqueness, then, it su¢ ces to demonstrate that what conditions the following is satis…ed:
Rearranging yields the condition: Check to see if
which is always satis…ed if: Standard errors in parentheses † signif. at 10%; * signif. at 5%; ** signif. at 1% Table 6 Determinants of probability of private securities class action litigation during the period 1992-2002
This table shows the regression estimation of the probability of a firm being sued in a certain year with respect to values of variables in the year before testing direct effect of the PSLRA. Panel A shows OLS estimation using a linear probability model of being sued in a current year with respect to incentive pay, volume, volatility and number of employees in a firm, the year before. The variable After PSLRA is a dummy variable indicating whether the suit year was after the promulgation of the PSLRA in January 1996. Panel B shows same estimations using salary level and an indicator of firms in manufacturing sector as instruments for incentive pay. Panel C shows estimation results on the same approach as in the first Panel using a logit specification. Model (1) is run on the entire dataset, where as Model (2) is run on a dataset excluding the year 1996. Model (3), (4) and (5) exclude the years 1996-1997, 1996-1998 and 1996-1999 respectively, in order to account for the transition period that may distort estimation on the effect that PSLRA may have had on litigations against public firms.
Panel A Linear Probability
Panel B Linear Probability with instrumental variables for incentive pay
Panel C Logit Regression -odds ratios ( .05e-09)** (4.11e-09)** (4.18e-09)** (4.38e-09)** (4.66e-09)** (5.33e-09)** (5.71e-09)** (5.95e-0)** (6.44e-09)** (6.75e-0)* (7.59e-08)** (7.30e-08)** (7.24e-08)** (7.33e-08)** (7.49e-08)* 
